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INTRODUCTION

It would be hard to say which is the more maligned offense, depraved heart
murder or felony murder. Depraved heart murder has been criticized as "archaic,
without rational content, and merely pejorative." Felony murder, meanwhile,
has been called "a living fossil," 2 "an unconstitutional fiction," 3 and "a
conundrum without principle." 4
These two offenses have evoked such criticisms because they both are
means of punishing non-intentional killings as murder. Depraved heart murder
elevates a reckless killing, which typically would be punished as manslaughter,
to murder based on an exceptional, extreme recklessness that demonstrates an
6
indifference to the value of human life. Felony murder punishes as murder a

1.
David Crump, "Murder, Pennsylvania Style": Comparing Traditional American
Homicide Law to the Statutes of Model Penal Code Jurisdictions, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 257, 307
(2007) (quoting Thomas v. State, 83 P.3d 818, 827 (Nev. 2004)).
2.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 159 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3.
Lynne H. Rambo, An UnconstitutionalFiction: The Felony-MurderRule as Applied to
the Supply ofDrugs, 20 GA. L. REV. 671 (1986).
4.
Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 763 (1999); see also Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A
Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 446 (1985) (quoting People v.
Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980); State v. Harrison, 564 P.2d 1321, 1324 (N.M. 1977); 3
J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 57, 65 (1883); H.L. Packer, Criminal
Code Revision, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1973)) ("Criticism of the rule constitutes a lexicon of
everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal doctrine: it has been described as
'astonishing' and 'monstrous,' an unsupportable 'legal fiction,' 'an unsightly wart on the skin of the
criminal law,' and as an 'anachronistic remnant' that has 'no logical or practical basis for existence
in modem law."'). Such criticism is not a recent development. See Note, Felony MurderAs a First
Degree Offense: An Anachronism Retained, 66 YALE L.J. 427, 427 (1957) ("The felony murder
doctrine occupies an anomalous and much criticized position in the American law of homicide.").
5.
See Tison, 481 U.S. at 170-172 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6.
As Professor Victoria Nourse has explained:
Depraved heart murder is fundamentally about indifference to others. The
depraved heart murderer is someone who fails to do something that all of us do
every day to those who are immediately before us: The murderer acts in
defiance of the consequences of his actions for others who rightly make an
immediate claim on his attentions. Whether, as was once said, for whim or
fancy, or for no reason at all, the depraved heart murderer acts in contempt of
his and our shared humanity. His crime is important precisely because he
appears to proceed on the assumption that he is the only man in the world.
V.F. Nourse, Hearts and Minds: Understandingthe New Culpability, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
361, 378-79 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
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death that occurs during the course of a felony regardless of mental culpability
for causing the death.
Nearly one-quarter of the states have abolished depraved heart murder,
limiting the definition of murder to include only deaths that are caused
intentionally, knowingly, or "with malice," and felony murder.8 What happens
in a jurisdiction that lacks a provision for depraved heart murder to those
defendants whose extreme recklessness has caused death? On one hand, it might
be expected that eliminating depraved heart murder would mean that those who
kill recklessly would be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder, given that
one of the ways of elevating a reckless killing to murder has been foreclosed. 9
And murder would be foreclosed altogether for someone who killed recklessly
while not committing a felony. On the other hand, given the abundance of
felony offenses, it seems probable that someone who killed recklessly also would
have been committing some sort of felony. The broadness of felony murderparticularly the common-law formulation of felony murder, lacking such limiting
doctrines as merger and inherent dangerousness-suggests that in jurisdictions
where depraved heart murder has been eliminated, those who kill with extreme
recklessness will not necessarily be convicted of manslaughter but instead might
be convicted of felony murder.
This Article considers a particular kind of reckless killing that, according to
one scholar, is "easily captured" by "classic depraved heart murder doctrine":
"the case of the intoxicated driver who hits another car head-on while traveling

7.
See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the
Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1433 (1994) ("In its
starkest, broadest form, the felony-murder rule provides that the killing of another human being in
the furtherance of any felonious enterprise constitutes the crime of murder.").
8.
The states that have eliminated depraved heart murder include Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 (LexisNexis 2007); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-42-1-1 (LexisNexis 2009); LA. STAT. ANN. §14:30.1 (2014); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.021
(West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (West 2015); NEB. STAT. ANN. § 28-303 (West 2015);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3 (LexisNexis 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(B); TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 39-11-302(b) (2013); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(b) (2015). Hawaii has also abolished
felony murder.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 (2007) ("In recognition of the trend toward, and the substantial
body of criticism supporting, the abolition of the felony murder rule, and because of the extremely
questionable results which the rule has worked in other jurisdictions, the Code has eliminated from
our law the felony-murder rule."). A few jurisdictions have eliminated felony murder but retained
depraved heart murder. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (LexisNexis 2014); Aaron, 299
N.W.2d at 335 (declaring "the offense popularly known as felony-murder, which, properly
understood, has nothing to do with malice and is not a species of common-law murder, shall no
longer exist in Michigan, if indeed it ever did").
9.
See Crump, supra note 1, at 312 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04 (West 2015))
(suggesting that "with evidence of recklessness, Texas would authorize indictment and conviction
for manslaughter").

4

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 67: 1

the wrong way down an expressway at speeds up to 100 miles per hour." 10 Of
course, intoxication presents several tricky questions for depraved heart murder
prosecutions. One question is whether "depraved heart" is a mens rea element;
another is whether intoxication can negate it if it is a mens rea element. 1 In
some jurisdictions, legislatures have answered (or sidestepped) such questions by
enacting statutes that disallow voluntary intoxication as a mens rea-negating
defense.12 In other jurisdictions, courts have achieved the same result by ruling
that defendants who become voluntarily intoxicated cannot argue that they were
too intoxicated to act recklessly because the mens rea of recklessness is satisfied
by the choice to become intoxicated under circumstances that risk causing harm
to others.13 Another difficulty is determining whether driving while intoxicated
is so reckless as to demonstrate "depraved indifference to the value of human

10. Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 97, 127 (2002); see
also Cristina Yu, Book Note, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1998) (reviewing MICHAEL
KURLAND, How TO TRY A MURDER: A HANDBOOK FOR ARMCHAIR LAWYERS (1997)) (explaining
that "sometimes drunk drivers who kill are convicted of second degree murder; by drinking and
driving these people show such a reckless disregard for their victims that it is tantamount to an
intention to kill").
11. For example, the New York Court of Appeals has stated, "The phrase 'under
circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life' is not a mens rea element focusing
on the subjective intent of the defendant but rather involves 'an objective assessment of the degree
of risk presented by defendant's reckless conduct."' People v. Gomez, 478 N.E.2d 759, 761 (N.Y.

1985) (quoting People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (N.Y. 1983)); see generally Bernard E.
Gegan, More Cases ofDepraved Mind Murder: The Problem ofMens Rea, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
429 (1990) (discussing the mens rea element of depraved heart murder).
12. See Monrad G. Paulson, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 7

(1961).
13. See, e.g., Register, 457 N.E.2d at 709 (deciding that intoxication is not a defense to
charge of depraved-heart murder because it is a form of recklessness). As Justice Traynor of the
Supreme Court of California explained:
[A] drunk man is capable of forming an intent to do something simple,
such as strike another, unless he is so drunk that he has reached the stage of
unconsciousness.
What he is not as capable as a sober man of doing is
exercising judgment about the social consequences of his acts or controlling
his impulses toward antisocial acts. He is more likely to act rashly and
impulsively and to be susceptible to passion and anger. It would therefore be
anomalous to allow evidence of intoxication to relieve a man of responsibility
for the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon or simple assault, which are so
frequently committed in just such a manner.

People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 379 (Cal. 1969).

The drafters of the Model Penal Code

similarly explained that becoming very drunk can establish the culpability for engaging in
prohibited conduct:
[A]wareness of the potential consequences of excessive drinking on the
capacity of human beings to gauge the risks incident to their conduct is by
now so dispersed in our culture that we believe it fair to postulate a general
equivalence between the risks created by the conduct of the drunken actor and
the risks created by his conduct in becoming drunk.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 9 1959).
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life."1 4 Many courts have found that it is, although others have ruled that it is
not. 16 Some commentators have argued that because driving while intoxicated is
statistically unlikely to cause death, it is categorically different from those acts
that are so likely to cause death-such as firing a gun into a crowd of people-as
to be evidence of a "depraved heart." 17
Felony murder, on the other hand, avoids all of these mens rea problems by
simply eliminating from the definition of the offense any requirement to prove
mental culpability for causing death.1 Felony murder punishes those who cause
death in the course of committing a felony, even if the death was wholly
accidental. 19

Given that in some cases driving while intoxicated is a felony, is felony
murder an appropriate way to punish those who cause death in the course of
driving while intoxicated? 20 The answer to this question depends not only upon
whether felony DWI is an appropriate predicate for felony murder but also upon
the interaction between felony murder and more specific offenses created to
punish drunken drivers who kill. During the 1970s, most states enacted statutes

14.

See infra note 15.

15. See, e.g., United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 948 (4th Cir. 1984); Allen v. State, 611
So. 2d 1188, 1193 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 282 (Cal. 1981);
People v. McCarnes, 224 Cal. Rptr. 846, 851 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Doub, 95 P.3d 116, 121
(Kan. Ct. App. 2004); Walden v. Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Ky. 1991); Hamilton v.
Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Ky. 1977) ("The facts in this case demonstrate that the
accident was not the typical automobile accident where a driver makes a gross error of judgment
and is tried for manslaughter or reckless homicide. Rather, Hamilton's conduct surpasses the usual
vehicle manslaughter case and demonstrates 'wanton' conduct and extreme indifference to human

life."); People v. Daniels, 698 N.Y.S.2d 120, 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (quoting Gomez, 478
N.E.2d at 761); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 337 A.2d 545, 547-548 (Pa. 1975); Commonwealth v.
Urbanski, 627 A.2d 789, 793-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
16. See, e.g., People v. Mays, 243 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (Ct. App. 1988) ("While the evidence
of his driving clearly manifests a careless indifference and, at times, a grossly negligent operation of
a motor vehicle in terms of unsafe speed and passing, it does not adequately reflect or support the
requisite conscious disregard for human life from which malice may be implied."); Blackwell v.

State, 369 A.2d 153, 158 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) ("We do not believe that an inference of
'viciousness' or 'extreme indifference to the value of human life' may be drawn from the past,
although persistent, drinking habits of an accused. While there may be depraved persons who
persistently drink, it does not follow that those who do drink are implicitly depraved. The practice

may be reprehensible, but it is not felonious."); State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674, 676 (Utah 1982)
("The record before us reflects that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the
offense of second degree murder, but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for the
included offense of manslaughter, supra. Particularly is this so in light of the defendant's own
admission at trial that he was aware of the risk occasioned by his conduct and that he consciously
chose to disregard it.").
17. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
18. See Gerber, supra note 4, at 763.
19. Some jurisdictions also require that the death be "in furtherance of' the felony. See infra
notes 108-13 and accompanying text.

20.
(2011).

See Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403, 448-82
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to address the particular problem of drunken drivers who kill.21 These offenses
are generally known as "vehicular manslaughter" or "intoxication manslaughter"
and seem to represent legislatures' assessment that manslaughter is the proper
charge in these cases.22 However, even after the enactment of these statutes,
some drunken drivers who kill have been prosecuted under a theory of depraved
heart murder.23 Additionally, in recent years-especially in some states that lack
depraved heart murder provisions-drunken drivers who kill have been
convicted of felony murder. 24
The purpose of this Article is not to undertake a general assessment of
felony murder. 25 Rather, in recognition of the increasing use of felony-murder
statutes to prosecute drunken drivers who kill, this Article considers various
criticisms and defenses of the felony-murder rule as they apply specifically to
26
felony DWI cases.
Part II of this Article discusses several recent precedentsetting cases in which drunken drivers who killed were prosecuted under felony
27
murder statutes. Part III explores whether such prosecutions are proper, given
the existence of special narrower vehicular manslaughter provisions that a

&

21. See ALA. CODE § 32-5A-191 (2010 & Supp. 2014); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030 (2012);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1381 (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65 (2005 & Supp. 2011); CAL.
VEH. CODE §§ 23152-23229.1 (West 2014 & Supp. 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1301 (2014);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227A (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177 (2013 & Supp. 2014); D.C.
CODE § 50-2201.05 (2001 & Supp. 2013); FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (2014 & Supp. 2015); GA. CODE
ANN. § 40-6-391 (2014 & Supp. 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 291-E (2010 & Supp. 2012); IDAHO
CODE § 18-8004 (2004 & Supp. 2013); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-500 to 5/11-505 (2014); IND.
CODE § 9-30-5 (2010 & Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-10 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
189.A (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 32:661 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 29-A, § 2411 (2014); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-902 (LexisNexis 2012);MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 90, § 24 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.625-257.626c (2014); MINN. STAT. § 169A
(2014); MIss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-30 (2013 & Supp. 2014); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 577.0-5770.54
(2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401 (2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,196 (2014); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 484C (2010 & Supp. 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:82 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
39:4-50 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2012); N.Y. VEH.
TRAF. LAW § 1192 (McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 3908-01 (2008 & Supp. 2013); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4511.19 to 4511.197 (LexisNexis 2004);
OKLA. STAT. TIT. 47 § 11-902 (2014); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 813.010 to 813.616 (2014); 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 3802 (2014); 31 R. I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-27-2 to 31-27-3 (2010 & Supp. 2012); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 56-5-2930 (2006); SD. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-23-1 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-401
(2012 & Supp. 2014); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 49.04 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a502 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1201 (2007 & Supp. 2012); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (2014 & 2015 Supp.); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502 (2014); W. VA. CODE
§ 20-7-18B (LexisNexis 2013); Wis. STAT. § 346.63 (2006); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-233 (2013).
22. See id. Whether it was a legislature's intent that vehicular manslaughter be the sole
offense that applies in these cases is discussed infra Part IIA.

23. See, e.g., People v. Heidgen, 980 N.E.3d 657, 667 (N.Y. 2013); People v. Taylor, 949
N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
24. See infra Parts IIA-B.
25.

See infra Part II.

26.

See infra Part III.

27.

See infra Part II.
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legislature might have intended to be the sole means of prosecuting drunk drivers
28
who kill.
Part IV discusses three particular limiting doctrines-merger,
inherent dangerousness, and res gestae-as applied to cases in which felony
29
DWI is the basis for a felony murder charge. Part V explores the culpability of
the repeat offender drunken driver who kills. Although felony murder and
felony drunken driving are both often described as "strict liability" offenses, this
part concludes that the repeat-offender drunk driver demonstrates a degree of
culpability that is not dissimilar to the culpability of defendants who have
committed felonies, such as robbery and arson, that have traditionally been
accepted as predicates for felony murder.30 Part VI argues that even if
prosecution of repeat DWI offenders is permissible under felony murder rules,
legislatures should revise driving while intoxicated statutes to impose murder
liability directly. Driving while intoxicated statutes that impose murder liability
directly, rather than allowing indirect imposition through the felony murder
statutes, would help ensure that only the most culpable DWI offenders are
punished for murder, and would also help promote a sense of fairness and
respect for the law.
The Article concludes that although felony murder prosecution of drunken
drivers who kill and who have previously been convicted of a DWI offense is
within the bounds of the felony murder doctrine, legislatures should-in the
interest of fair notice-revise penal codes to make clear that drunken drivers
who kill are subject to prosecution not only for manslaughter but also for
murder. 3 1
II.

PRECEDENT-SETTING CASES

Of the dozen states that have eliminated depraved heart murder, twoMissouri and Texas-have in recent years been especially active in prosecuting
32
drunken drivers who kill under felony murder provisions.
A.

Missouri

In 1996, a Missouri jury convicted Kenneth Pembleton of three counts of
second-degree felony murder for causing the deaths of three people.33 The
victims were killed when Pembleton, after a night of heavy drinking, was
speeding, failed to stop at a stop sign, and crashed his car into another car

28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. This argument is not meant as a general endorsement of the felony murder rule; instead, it
is meant as a suggestion that if any felonies are sufficiently culpable to warrant felony-murder
liability, then repeat offender DWI felonies can be included.
31. See infra Part VI.
32. See infra Parts II.A-B.
33. State v. Pembleton, 978 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
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causing both cars to travel over an embankment.34 More than an hour after the
crash, Pembleton's blood-alcohol level was more than twice the legal limit. 35

Under Missouri law, both the felony murder statute and the involuntary
manslaughter statute potentially applied to Pembleton's case.36 According to
Missouri's felony murder statute, "A person commits the crime of murder in the
second degree if he: . . . (2) commits .

.

. any felony, and, in the perpetration of

such felony . .. another person is killed as a result of the perpetration of such
felony."37 Under the involuntary manslaughter statute, "A person commits the
crime of involuntary manslaughter if he: ...
(2) While in an intoxicated
condition operates a motor vehicle in this state and, when so operating, acts with
criminal negligence to cause the death of any person." 38
For a first offense, involuntary manslaughter is at most a Class B felony,39
which is punishable by "a term of years not less than five years and not to exceed
fifteen years." 40 Felony murder, on the other hand, is a Class A felony,
punishable by "a term of years not less than ten years and not to exceed thirty
years, or life imprisonment." 41
Because Pembleton had two prior convictions for driving while intoxicated,
42
he was charged as a persistent offender, which is a felony.
This enabled the
prosecutor to charge Pembleton with felony murder, with felony DWI as the
43
The jury found him guilty and sentenced him to 25 years on
predicate felony.
each of the three counts, to run concurrently.44
A year after the Pembleton case, Robin Mayer was similarly convicted of
felony murder with felony DWI as the underlying felony.45 Mayer's driver's
license had been revoked because of seven previous DWI convictions, and at the
time that his truck struck a car and killed a ten-year-old child, his blood-alcohol
level was "nearly 0.30, three times the legal limit for intoxication." 46 Mayer was
convicted not only of felony murder but also of eight other charges related to the

34.
35.
36.

Id. at 353-54.
Id. at 354.
Id. (citing Mo. ANN. STAT.

37.

§ 565.021.
§ 565.024.

§§

565.021, 565.024 (West 2015)).

38.
39. Id. ("Involuntary manslaughter in the first degree under subdivision (1) or (2) of
subsection 1 of this section is a class C felony. Involuntary manslaughter in the first degree under
subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of this section is a class B felony. A second or subsequent violation
of subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of this section is a class A felony.").
40. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 558.011 (West 2015).
41. Id.
42. State v. Pembleton, 978 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. State v. Mayer, 3 S.W.3d 423, 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
46. Tim Rowden, Hillsboro Man's Murder Conviction is Upheld in Crash that Killed Girl
Driver'sDaughter was also Paralyzed in Two-Car Accident Blood-Alcohol Level was Nearly 0.3,
THE ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 11, 1999, 1999 WLNR 929471.
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fatal crash, and he was sentenced to an aggregated prison term of forty-two
years, six months.4 7
B.

Texas

In 2002, Mark Wayne Lomax became the first person to be prosecuted under
Texas's revised penal code for felony murder on the basis of felony driving
48
while intoxicated.
Under this code's felony murder provision, a person
commits the offense of murder if he "commits or attempts to commit a felony,
other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the
commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt,
he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that
causes the death of an individual."4 9 Lomax also could have been charged with
intoxication manslaughter, which provides that "a person commits an offense if
the person: (1)

operates a motor vehicle in a public place .

.

. and (2) is

intoxicated and by reason of that intoxication causes the death of another by
accident or mistake. 5 0
Driving while intoxicated is generally a misdemeanor offense, but the
offense is elevated to a felony after two prior convictions. 5 Because Lomax had
two prior convictions, he was charged with felony DWI and also with felony
52
murder, rather than intoxication manslaughter.
If Lomax had been convicted
of intoxication manslaughter-a second-degree felony53 -the maximum penalty
would have been 20 years in prison.54 A conviction for felony murder-a firstdegree felony-allowed for a sentence of up to life in prison. Lomax admitted
to "speeding, weaving in and out of traffic, and tailgating," and his blood alcohol
content was nearly three times the legal limit an hour after the crash that killed a

47. Mayer v. Dormire, No. 4:03CV1562 FRB, 2005 WL 2454028, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 3,
2005).
48. Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A previous version of the
penal code had also been interpreted to allow felony murder prosecutions based on felony DWI.
See, e.g., Fox v. State, 165 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942) (stating that defendant was
indicted for violating a felony statute by driving while intoxicated and killing someone while doing
so).
49. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (West 2015).
50. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08(a) (West 2015).
51. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b)(2) (West 2015).
52. Carol Christian, Murder Charge brought in DWI Death, HouSTON CHRONICLE, Apr. 12,
2002, 2002 WLNR 13584984.
53. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08 (West 2015).
54. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.33(a) (West 2015) ("An individual adjudged guilty of a
felony of the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2 years.").
55. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(a) (West 2015) ("An individual adjudged guilty of a
felony of the first degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years.").
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five-year-old child. A jury found Lomax guilty and sentenced him to 55 years
in prison. 57
Since Lomax, an increasing number of repeat DWI offenders are being
58
prosecuted under Texas's felony murder statute.
In some jurisdictions, felony
murder has become the standard offense for prosecuting repeat DWI offenders
whose drunken driving causes death.59 In San Antonio, for example, a recent
news article reported:
"Anytime that we can pursue them as felony murders based on DWIs,
that's the direction we're almost always going to move in," said
Assistant District Attorney David Henderson, who recently took charge
of the office's DWI unit. "When we've had to (prosecute) twice before,
it's an appropriate response."60
Although so far the Missouri and Texas courts of appeals, as well as the
federal courts on collateral review, have affirmed all of these felony murder
61
convictions of repeat DWI offenders who killed, these prosecutions raise a
number of problematic questions. The first issue is whether intoxication-specific
manslaughter offenses preempt general homicide offenses. The second problem
is whether application of felony murder limiting doctrines precludes felony DWI
as a basis for felony murder liability. Additionally, there is the question whether
felony DWI is sufficiently culpable to warrant felony murder liability. Finally,
the complexity of the legal rules required to prosecute felony DWI as felony
murder means that the average person is likely to be surprised to learn that
drunken drivers who kill are subject to murder liability.

56. Lomax v. State, No. 10-03-00156-CR, 2006 WL 871723, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 29,
2006), aff'd, 233 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
57. Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
58. See, e.g., Hollin v. State, 227 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); Mendoza v. State,
No. 08-04-00369-CR, 2006 WL 2328508, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2006); Stickland v. State,
193 S.W.3d 662, 664 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
59.

See, e.g., Craig Kapitan, Drunk Driving can be Murder; Repeat DWI Offenders to Face

HarsherCharge, SAN ANTONIo EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 25, 2013, 2013 WLNR 7443041 (reporting
that drunk driving can be murder).

60. Id.
61. See Adams v. Stephens, No. 3:13-CV-854-M, 2014 WL 3728603, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July
28, 2014); Strickland v. Thaler, No. 4:09-CV-746-Y, 2010 WL 4181266, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9,
2010); Lomax v. Thaler, No. H-09-0705, 2010 WL 3362203, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2010);
Mayerv. Dormire, No. 4:03CV1562 FRB, 2005 WL 2454028, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2005).
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III. THE FIRST PROBLEM: THE SPECIFIC OR THE GENERAL?

A.

In PariMateria

One question that arises when drunken drivers who kill are charged with
felony murder-a general offense-rather than vehicular or intoxication
manslaughter-a more particular offense that applies to the same conduct and
result-is whether such charges are contrary to the intent of the legislature. This
question is based on the possibility that by enacting a specific provision that
punishes drunken drivers who kill, the legislature might have meant that the
particular provision should govern such cases, and also meant that more general
provisions should not apply.
For example, Pembleton argued that "the
legislature intended for involuntary manslaughter to be the only crime that a
person could be prosecuted for when he kills another person while driving in an
intoxicated state." 62 What does it mean that a legislature has enacted a statute
that specifically criminalizes causing a death by means of driving while
intoxicated?
Courts faced with this question turn to the principle of in pari materia-the
principle that two related statutes should be read together in a way that achieves
63
the intent of the legislature.
Based on the reasoning that there is nothing
inconsistent about having two provisions that criminalize causing death by
means of driving while intoxicated, courts have found that legislatures intended
for both to apply and have found no need to choose the specific over the
64
general.
For example, in Lomax, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals first
noted that the language of the felony murder provision "does not exclude felony
DWI as an underlying felony for a felony-murder prosecution."65 The court then
reasoned that "a general and a more specific statute might be viewed as
proscribing the same conduct does not, standing alone, compel a conclusion that
the Legislature intended that this conduct be prosecuted exclusively under the
more specific statute."66 The court explained that two statutes are in pari
materia only when:
one statute deals with a subject in comprehensive terms and another
deals with a portion of the same subject in a more definite way. The

62. State v. Pembleton, 978 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
63. Id. (citing Bartley v. Special Sch. Dist., 649 S.W.2d. 864, 867 (Mo. 1983)).
64. See, e.g., Pembleton, 978 S.W.2d at 355; Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Hollin v. State, 277 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. App. 2006); Strickland v. State, 193
S.W.3d 662, 668 (Tex. App. 2006). But see Blackwell v. State, 369 A.2d 153, 158 (Md. App. 1977)
("[W]e have held that in enacting the manslaughter by automobile statute, Md.Code, Art. 27, § 388,
the legislature intended to preempt the subject matter of unintended homicides resulting from the
operation of a motor vehicle.").
65. Lomax, 233 S.W.3d at 309.
66. Id. Two intermediate courts of appeals reached the same conclusion. See Hollin, 227
S.W.3d at 121; Strickland, 193 S.W.3d at 665-66.
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rule is not applicable to enactments that cover different situations and
that were apparently not intended to be considered together. The two
statutes at issue here (felony murder and intoxication manslaughter)
obviously cover different situations and apparently were not intended to
be considered together. The felony-murder statute covers a variety of
homicides during the commission of a felony while the intoxication
67
manslaughter statute is specifically limited to a DWI homicide.
Not all of the justices agreed, however. Two justices dissented on the
grounds that the specific intoxication manslaughter provision does conflict with,
and therefore should prevail over, the general felony murder provision.68 As the
dissenting opinion argued: "The felony-murder section is general, applying to a
wide range of offenses. The intoxication manslaughter statute deals specifically
with causing a death as a result of driving while intoxicated, whether the DWI
offense is the first, third, or twenty-third." 69 This difference means, the dissent
argued, that "the special provision should prevail-a death that results from
driving while intoxicated must be prosecuted as intoxication manslaughter."
B. ProsecutorialDiscretion
In Lomax, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied on the text of the
statutes to determine that in enacting the intoxication manslaughter statute, the
legislature had not meant to make that offense the sole means of punishing
drunken drivers who kill.70 In Pembleton and subsequent cases, the Missouri
courts of appeals have examined the question of legislative intent one step
further, attempting to harmonize the specific and general statutes by assuming
that the legislature meant to give prosecutors the option to choose to prosecute
under either of the statutes, given that prosecutors generally possess discretion to
determine which charges best fit the facts of particular cases. 7 ' As the court
explained in Pembleton, "because a prosecutor has the discretion of choosing
which statute to proceed on when two statutes proscribe the same behavior, there
is no conflict between the more specific DWI statute and the general criminal
,,72
statute.'
And in a later case, the court further explained:

67. Lomax, 233 S.W.3d at 312 (citations omitted). In California, the legislature has codified its
intent that the vehicular manslaughter statute does not supersede or preempt the murder statute. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 191.5(e) (West 2015) ("This section shall not be construed as prohibiting or precluding a
charge of murder under Section 188 upon facts exhibiting wantonness and a conscious disregard for life to
support a finding of implied malice, or upon facts showing malice, or upon facts showing malice
consistent with the holding of the California Supreme Court in People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290.")
68. Id. at 313 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 309.
71. State v. Pembleton, 978 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
72. Id.
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It is axiomatic that a single act may constitute an offense under two
different statutes. It is then the responsibility of the prosecutor to elect
under which statute to proceed. For example, in State v. Pembleton, this
Court examined whether a drunk driver could properly stand convicted
of second-degree felony-murder rather than involuntary manslaughter
for the three deaths he caused. The defendant argued that he should
have been prosecuted under the more specific involuntary-manslaughter
statute. We upheld the convictions for second-degree murder, noting
that only when two statutes cannot be reasonably harmonized does the
more specific prevail over a more general statute. More importantly, we
held that because Missouri courts recognize that a prosecutor has
discretion to prosecute under either of two statutes, the statutes were
reasonably harmonized.73
In cases that could be prosecuted under either the specific intoxication
manslaughter statute or the more general felony murder statute, it is logical to
think, as did the dissenting justices in Lomax, that the legislature might have
intended for the specific to govern.74 However, given that many cases can only
be prosecuted as one or the other, it is unlikely that the legislature intended for
the intoxication manslaughter statute to displace the felony murder statute. On
the other hand, to the extent that the average citizen would be justified in
thinking that intoxication manslaughter is the sole homicide offense that applies
to cases in which a drunken driver kills, the problem is not preclusion but
notice.
The desirability of making clear to the public that drunken drivers who
kill are subject not only to manslaughter charges but also to murder charges is
addressed in Part IVB.
IV. THE SECOND PROBLEM: FELONY MURDER'S LIMITING DOCTRINES

Felony murder is an offense that requires no proof of mental culpability with
respect to causing death. Although many critics have alleged that punishing as
murder an accidental killing that occurs during the commission of a felony
serves no legitimate purpose, courts and legislatures have continued to accept
76
and even embrace the felony murder rule.
Historically, the felony murder rule
applied to any death that occurred during the commission of robbery, rape,

73. State v. Kaiser, 139 S.W.3d 545, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Koen, 468
S.W.2d 635, 629 (Mo. 1971); Pembleton, 978 S.W.2d at 355-56; State v. Grady, 691 S.W.2d 301,
303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).
74. Lomax, 233 S.W.3d at 313-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
75. See, e.g., id. at 305 (majority holding that Texas' felony-murder statute dispenses with a
culpable mental state).
76. See Guyora Binder, The Origins ofAmerican Felony MurderRules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59,
60 (2004).
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arson, burglary, or kidnapping."
At common law, these felonies were
themselves capital offenses, and so as a practical matter a defendant who was
convicted of felony murder for causing a death during a robbery was subject to
the same sentence-death that he would have received had he been convicted
only of the robbery.
As legislatures adopted lesser punishments for felonies other than murder, as
well as designated additional crimes as felonies, questions have arisen regarding
which felonies can and should serve as a predicate for felony murder.79
Under modem statutes, in a few jurisdictions any felony at all can serve as a
basis for felony murder.so Most states, however, have adopted one or more
doctrines that limit which felonies can give rise to felony murder liability.8
Three doctrines that are especially important to felony murder as applied to the
drunken driver who kills are the merger doctrine, the inherently dangerous
felony doctrine, and the res gestae doctrine. 82
A.

Merger

Under the merger doctrine, the felony murder rule does not apply if the
underlying felony is an integral part of and is included in fact in the death. 83
Operation of the merger doctrine thus prohibits simple assault from serving as
the basis for felony murder, if the act of assaulting the victim is the cause of the
84
victim's death.
Similarly, manslaughter cannot serve as a basis for felony

77.

Id. at 60-61 (citing 1 WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON

THE LAW OF CRIMES 514-16 (1900)).
78. Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 558
(1934); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 at 31 n.74 (AMER. LAW. INST., Official Draft 1980). On the
other hand, even though all felonies were punishable by death, in actual practice felonies other than
murder might have been less likely to be punished by death. See Tomkovicz, supra note 7, at 1446
n.75.
79. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 785-86 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing
history of the felony-murder doctrine and limitations to certain felonies).
80. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.021 (West 2015) ("A person commits the crime of
murder in the second degree if he: . . (2) commits . . any felony, and, in the perpetration . . of
such felony . . . another person is killed as a result of the perpetration . .. of such felony.").

81. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 79, at 786-89 (discussing limitation to certain
felonies).
82. See generally id. at 785-807 (discussing felonies that merge into the murder, felonies
which are inherently dangerous, and killings that occur in the res gestae of the felony).
83. See Binder, supra note 20, at 90.
84. Robert L. Simpson, Annotation, Application of Felony-Murder Doctrine Where the
Felony Relied Upon is an Includible Offense with the Homicide, 40 A.L.R.3d 1341, 1345 (1971) ("It
has been held or recognized in a number of cases that the felony-murder doctrine is not applicable
in cases of felonious assault resulting in death, on the ground that the assault merges into the
homicide.").
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murder; otherwise, every reckless killing would be felony murder.
A proper
predicate for felony murder includes some act aside from the act that caused the
victim's death. 86

As applied to drunken drivers who kill, application of the merger doctrine
might mean that felony DWI cannot serve as the basis for felony murder. The
Texas court of appeals considered this argument in Lomax.8 7 The defendant
argued that he could not be convicted of felony murder because "the act of
killing someone while driving while intoxicated cannot be separated from the
felony offense of intoxication manslaughter; therefore, the two merge and
prosecution under the felony murder statute is precluded." 88
In Texas, however, courts have interpreted the penal code's felony murder
provision to mean that the only offense that merges with the homicide, and thus
cannot serve as a basis for felony murder, is manslaughter (or a lesser included
offense). 89 This is because of the specific language of the felony murder statute,
which states that someone commits felony murder if he "commits or attempts to
commit a felony, other than manslaughter. . . "90 Felony DWI is not a lesser
included offense of manslaughter and thus under Texas law, felony DWI does
not merge with an accidental killing that occurs during the commission of that
felony. 91
B. Inherently Dangerous
In most jurisdictions, only certain enumerated felonies can serve as a
predicate for felony murder.92 Typical enumerated felonies include those that
were punishable by death at common law-burglary, arson, rape, and
93
kidnapping.
Other jurisdictions limit predicate felonies to those that are

85. See, e.g., Malone v. State, 232 S.E.2d 907, 908 (Ga. 1977) ("[V]oluntary manslaughter,
and the felony of involuntary manslaughter where it applies, are not themselves felonies which will
invoke the felony murder rule").
86. Simpson, supra note 84, at 1343 ("[T]he rule is that the felony-murder doctrine does not
apply unless the felony committed during the homicide is so distinct from it as not to be an
ingredient of it, indictable therewith, or convictable thereunder.").
87. Lomax v. State, No. 10-03-00156-CR, 2006 WL 871723, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 29,
2006), aff'd, 233 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
88. Id. at *3. Lomax did not raise the merger issue on appeal to the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
89. Id. ("The merger doctrine ... applies only to prosecutions for felony murder under
Section 19.02(a)(3) where the underlying felony is manslaughter or a lesser included offense of
manslaughter." (citing Homan v. State, 19 S.W.3d 847, 849 n. 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
90. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (West 2015).
91. Lomax, 2006 WL 871723, at *3; see also Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302, 311 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007) ("We nevertheless decide that felony DWI is not a lesser included offense of
intoxication manslaughter.").
92. See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 316 n.79 (Mich. 1980) (observing that "[t]he
majority of states which have a statutory felony-murder rule enumerate the felonies").
93. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 202 (2014) ("murder, robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, arson, gross sexual assault, or escape"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2014)
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"inherently dangerous to human life."94 In Texas, any felony (other than
manslaughter) can serve as the basis for felony murder if "in the course of and in
furtherance of' the felony, the actor "commits or attempts to commit an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual."9 5 In
Missouri, the felony murder statute does not include any language limiting the
predicate felony to a dangerous felony; thus, any felony may serve as the
predicate for felony murder.96
Among the states that enumerate the felonies that can serve as a basis for
felony murder, none include driving while intoxicated on the list. 97

Among

states that specify only that the predicate felony must be "inherently dangerous,"
at least some have found that felony drunken driving is inherently dangerous. 98
In Virginia, for example, several appellate courts have ruled that driving while
intoxicated is an inherently dangerous felony. 99 As one court recently explained,
driving while intoxicated or recklessly is a felony considered to be
"inherently dangerous." By implication, it presents a substantial risk to
life. "' [T]he increased risk of death or serious harm occasioned by the
commission of" appellant's felony of driving while intoxicated
demonstrated appellant's "'lack of concern for human life' and
constitutes the justification for imputing malice. 00

("murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking or the crime of
contempt").
94. See, e.g., People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 897 (Cal. 1984) (en banc) ("At the outset
we must determine whether the underlying felony is 'inherently dangerous to human life."'); State
v. Brantley, 691 P.2d 26, 28 (Kan. 1984) ("[T]o invoke the felony murder rule there must be proof a
homicide was committed in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate a felony and that the
collateral felony was one inherently dangerous to human life.").
95. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (West 2015).
96. State v. Pembleton, 978 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) ("It is true that many
jurisdictions have enacted legislation that limits the application of the felony murder rule to cases
where the underlying felony is either a 'dangerous' felony or one that is malum per se. However, as
we illustrated above, section 565.021.1(2) states that a person is guilty of second degree felony
murder if he commits any felony and in the perpetration of that felony, another person is killed.")
(internal citations omitted); see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.021 (West 2015) ("A person commits
the crime of murder in the second degree if he: . . . (2) commits . . . any felony, and, in the

perpetration . . of such felony . . another person is killed as a result of the perpetration . . of such
felony.").
97. See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 316 n.79.
98. See, e.g., Burroughs, 678 P.2d at 897 ("At the outset we must determine whether the
underlying felony is 'inherently dangerous to human life."'); Brantley, 691 P.2d at 28 ("[T]o invoke
the felony murder rule there must be proof a homicide was committed in the perpetration of or an
attempt to perpetrate a felony and that the collateral felony was one inherently dangerous to human
life.").
99. See, e.g., Montano v. Commonwealth, 739 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting
Davis v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 377, 380 (Va. Ct. App. 1991)).
100. Id. (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 377, 380 (Va. Ct. App. 1991); Spain v.
Commonwealth. 373 S.E.2d 728, 732-33 (Va. Ct. App. 1988)); accord State v. Smoot, 737 N.W.2d
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Is felony driving while intoxicated a dangerous felony? Certainly an
intoxicated driver is more likely to cause a fatal crash than a non-intoxicated
driver.' 0' Critics, however, assert that drunken driving is not an especially
dangerous activity, given that many people drive while intoxicated yet do not
cause death.102 On the other hand, none of the other felonies that have
traditionally served as predicates for felony murder is especially statistically
dangerous either. For example, according to one scholar, "only about .6 percent
of all armed robberies end in death.',103 But do such statistics really mean that
armed robbery is not a dangerous activity? Not necessarily: "If the average
robbery takes an hour (probably a high estimate), that means one homicide
occurs every 166 hours of robbery. If everyday activities were as dangerous as
robbery, and if the average person is awake 16 hours a day, then the average
person would kill one person every eleven days." 10 4 In sum, although any
specific incident of driving while intoxicated does not pose a statistically great
risk of death, driving while intoxicated is no less dangerous than other felonies
that have traditionally served as predicates for felony murder.
C. Res Gestae
The res gestae limitation imposes felony murder liability for deaths that are
caused by a felony and excludes from felony murder liability deaths that are
merely coincidental to the felony.105 As one court explained,
Generally, in determining whether a felony murder has been committed,
the critical factor is the existence of a causal connection between the

849, 852 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) ("An impaired person who drives, operates, or takes physical
control of a vehicle poses an indisputable risk to human life.").
101. Additionally, "[d]rivers with a BAC of .08 or higher involved in fatal crashes were seven
times more likely to have a prior conviction for driving while impaired (DWI) than were drivers in
fatal crashes with no alcohol." NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: 2012 DATA, ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING (December 2013).
102. For example, one justice of the Supreme Court of California argued: "While driving
intoxicated is dangerous, injury is not probable. Thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of
Californians each week reach home without accident despite their driving intoxicated." Taylor v.
Super. Ct. of L.A., 598 P.2d 854, 864 (Cal. 1979) (Clark, J., dissenting).
103. Kevin Cole, Killings DuringCrime: Toward A DiscriminatingTheory of Strict Liability,
28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 105 (1991) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at 38 n.96 (AM.
LAW INST., Official Draft 1980)); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799-800 nn.23-24
(1982) (referencing statistics that show that only about one-half of one percent of robberies end in
homicide).
104. Cole, supra note 103, at 105. Additionally, as Professor Glanville Williams suggested,
"the risk involved in taking one gun from a group of one million guns, only one of which is loaded,
and firing it at another reasonable creature is unreasonable given the total absence of social utility in
the conduct." Paul H. Robinson, Imputed CriminalLiability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 664 n.220 (1984)
(citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 59-61 (2d ed. 1961)).
105. Montano, 739 S.E.2d at 244.
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felony and the accidental killing. A felon is not necessarily subject to
criminal liability under the felony murder rule for every death which
occurs while a felony is being committed. Otherwise, the felony-murder
doctrine would make a felon absolutely liable for the accidental death of
another person even though that death was a mere coincidence and not a
consequence of the felony. Therefore, a "mere nexus" between the
felony and the accidental death will not invoke the felony murder
doctrine. Rather, the act or acts causing death must have been directly
calculated to further the felony or necessitated by the commission of the
felony.106

In the prototypical felony murder case, the robber shoots the victim to effect
the robbery. The death thus occurs not only in the course of but also in
furtherance of the felony. It has been argued by some defendants that when a
drunken driver causes a death, the death is not in furtherance of the felony of
driving while intoxicated. 0 7
It is true that the drunken driver who causes death by driving the wrong way
on the interstate, for example, or who crosses the center line, is not like the
robber who causes death by shooting the victim so that he can complete the
robbery. The drunken driver does not kill for the purpose of completing the
offense of driving while intoxicated. On the other hand, in many cases in which
a defendant has caused death during a felony, the deaths were not strictly in
furtherance of the felony. For example, in the case of arson, the arsonist's
purpose is to bum down the building. Whether anyone is killed is beside the
point of the felony. However, if the arsonist bums down a building that is
occupied and the occupant dies, then the arsonist has committed felony murder.
As one court explained,
In this case, the elements of res gestae were proved. The expert
testimony made clear that the car accident which killed the victim
occurred because appellant was highly intoxicated while he was driving.
Appellant's vision, motor skills, and reaction time were all adversely
affected by his intoxication, and nothing in the record suggests that the
accident likely would have occurred had appellant not been under the

106. Davis v. Commonwealth., 404 S.E.2d 377, 378-79 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (citing King v.
Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 704, 706-709 (Va. Ct. App. 1988)); see also Dana K. Cole, Expanding
Felony-Murderin Ohio: Felony-Murderor Murder-Felony?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 15, 22-23 (2002).
107. See, e.g., Montano, 739 S.E.2d at 244 (noting appellant's argument that "the unintended
death that occurred as a result of the accident was not in furtherance of either driving under the
influence or driving with a suspended license, and, therefore, should not be considered within the
res gestae of the felonies") (internal punctuation omitted); Bigon v. State, No. 03-05-00692-CR,

2006 WL 2852476, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2006), aff'd, 252 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) ("Appellant argues that the State failed to prove that his act of driving into the oncoming lane
of traffic was 'in furtherance' of the felony DWI with a child passenger.").
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influence of alcohol. On the contrary, the evidence established that the
underlying felony of driving while intoxicated caused the collision and
resulted in an accidental death. . . . Appellant's intoxicated operation of

his vehicle was, thus, inextricably linked and integral to the victim's
death. 108

The fact that an intoxicated driver caused a death does not necessarily mean
that the driver's intoxication caused the death. This is an issue not only in felony
murder cases but in intoxication manslaughter cases as well. In some states, the
prosecution must prove "that the intoxication was a cause of the victim's
death."'1 09 In other states, though, "under the vehicular homicide statute, it is not
necessary to establish that the intoxication was the proximate cause of the
victim's death."" 0 In order for the victim's death to be within the res gestae of a
defendant's felony DWI, the prosecution should be required to prove that the
defendant's intoxication caused the victim's death. Thus, the res gestae doctrine
is most likely to limit application of the felony murder rule in felony DWI cases
if a defendant can plausibly claim that the death would have occurred even if the
defendant had not been intoxicated."'
V.

THE THIRD PROBLEM: STRICT LIABILITY OR RECKLESS INDIFFERENCE?

A.

Felony Murder and Felony DWI as Strict Liability Offenses

Felony murder has been criticized as imposing strict liability for murder.112
As criminal law casebooks routinely explain to first-year law students, strict
liability offenses were enacted to combat particular problems created by
industrialization, especially the problem that factories could produce large
quantities of goods that were harmful, potentially injuring or killing large
numbers of people.11 3 Investigation and prosecution of these harms on an
individualized level was impractical, and so legislatures sought to prevent such
harms by imposing criminal liability based solely on committing an act that
caused such harm, regardless of any intent, knowledge, recklessness, or even
negligence in committing the act.1 4 Typically, strict liability offenses are aimed

108. Montano, 739 S.E.2d at 244.
109. Eric

A.

Johnson,

Wrongful-Aspect

Overdetermination:

The

Scope-of-the-Risk

Requirement in Drunk-DrivingHomicide, 46 CONN. L. REv. 601, 605 (2013) (quoting Lupro v.
State 603 P.2d 468, 475 (Alaska 1979)).
110. Id. at 606 n.18 (quoting People v. Acosta, 860 P.2d 1376, 1381 (Colo. App. 1993)).
111. See id.; State v. Guzman, 96 P.3d 1173, 1178 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004)).
112. See Tomkovicz, supra note 7, at 1433.

113. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994); United States v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1978); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
114. See Staples, 522 U.S. at 606; U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437-38; Morissette, 343 U.S.
at 250.
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at protecting the general health and welfare of the public, would be difficult to
investigate and prosecute on a case-by-case basis, are malum prohibitum rather
than malum in se, and impose limited punishment." 5
Statutes that impose strict liability mean that anyone, regardless of any
degree of culpability, may be convicted.116 Strict liability for criminal offenses
is contrary to the basic tenets of the law: "To inflict substantial punishment upon
one who is morally entirely innocent, who caused injury through reasonable
mistake or pure accident, would so outrage the feelings of the community as to
nullify its own enforcement."" 7
Some defenders of the felony murder doctrine have responded that felony
murder does not punish wholly innocent conduct; instead, the mens rea of the
underlying felony provides the mens rea for the murder." 8 But what if the
underlying felony itself requires no proof of a particular mens rea? Is felony
murder then a wholly strict liability offense, punishing conduct in the absence of
any culpable mental state? This is an issue in felony murder prosecutions of
drunken drivers who kill, because felony DWI statutes typically do not require
proof of any mens rea.
In these cases, courts have done a bad job addressing the issue of strict
liability. In Pembleton, for example, the Missouri court of appeals asserted that
"under Missouri's felony murder statutory scheme, any underlying felony
supplies the requisite mens rea for second-degree felony murder" and "the state
proved that defendant acted with the requisite mens rea to commit the underlying
felony of DWI, third offense," and therefore "the state proved that defendant
acted with the requisite mens rea to commit the underlying felony of DWI, third

115. See Staples, 522 U.S. at 606; U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437-38; Morissette, 343 U.S.
at 250; United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438 (3d Cir. 1943) ("Where the offenses
prohibited and made punishable are capable of inflicting widespread injury, and where the
requirement of proof of the offender's guilty knowledge and wrongful intent would render
enforcement of the prohibition difficult if not impossible (i.e., in effect tend to nullify the statute)
the legislative intent to dispense with mens rea as an element of the offense has justifiable basis");
Kimberly D. Kessler, The Role of Luck in the CriminalLaw, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2183, 2193 n.46
(1994) ("Strict liability imposes liability without regard to whether the defendant made a mistake or
the act (or harm) was accidental. Impure food and drug regulations are one category of this type of
prohibited conduct. Because such regulations are not typically based on those things that are bad in
and of themselves (malum in se) but rather those that are bad because the law says they are (malum
prohibitum), strict liability does not carry with it the same moral force.").
116. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the CriminalLaw, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 731
(1960).
117. Id. (quoting Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56
(1933)).
118. See, e.g., Roary v. State, 867 A.2d 1095, 1100 (Md. 2005) (quoting Fisher v. State 786
A.2d 706, 732 (Md. 2001); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.5 (2d. ed.
2003)); Commonwealth v. Prater, 725 N.E.2d 233, 241-243 (Mass. 2000) (citations omitted);
Heacock v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 90, 93 (Va. 1984) (quoting Wooden v. Commowealth, 284
S.E.2d 811, 814 (Va. 1981)).
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But the underlying felony in this case did not require proof of any
particular mens rea.120 Under Missouri law, "A person commits the crime of
'driving while intoxicated' if he operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated
or drugged condition."121 Intoxication is defined as a being "under the influence
of alcohol, a controlled substance, or drug, or any combination thereof."'1 22 A
persistent offender is someone "who has pleaded guilty to or has been found
guilty of two or more intoxication-related traffic offenses.' 23
Arguably, the court in Pembleton gave the matter of mens rea insufficient
attention, not even acknowledging that felony DWI as a predicate for felony
murder is a departure from the traditional felony murder model. In Mayer, the
court acknowledged the departure but simply concluded that the legislature
wrote the felony murder statute that way.124 In sum, the Missouri appellate
courts seem untroubled by the prospect of murder as a strict liability offense. It
is possible that what the Pembleton court meant by "under Missouri's felony
murder statutory scheme, any underlying felony supplies the requisite mens rea
for second degree felony murder" is that by committing a felony, Pembleton
acted with sufficient culpability to justify the murder conviction.125 This might
have been true at common law, when all felonies were malum in se as well as
punishable by death, but certainly modem penal codes include many felonies
that cannot supply the culpability for murder.126
Courts in Texas have also failed to seriously address the argument that using
felony DWI as a predicate for felony murder converts murder into a wholly strict
liability offense.127 In Lomax, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted
review specifically to consider the question: "Can a felony murder conviction be
based on an underlying felony that expressly requires no mens rea, despite the
fact that in a felony-murder conviction, the mens rea for the act of murder is
supplied by the mens rea of the underlying felony?"1 28 Although the court
seemed ready to give this question serious consideration,129 in the end it decided
the matter solely on the basis of what it determined to be the Texas legislature's
intent in drafting the felony murder statute.130 Because the legislature meant to

119. State v. Pembleton, 978 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Mannon,
637 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Mo. 1982) (emphasis omitted)).
120. Id.
121. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.010(1) (West 2015).
122. § 577.001(13).
123. § 577.023(5)(a).
124. State v. Mayer, 3 S.W.3d 423, 425-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Pembleton, 978
S.W.2d at 355).
125. Pembleton, 978 S.W.2d at 356.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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dispense with a mens rea element for felony murder, no mens rea element is
required. 131

The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that the felony murder statute
"might contain some features not normally associated with 'strict liability'
offenses," but the court ignored any problems with the possibility of murder as a
strict liability offense, concluding that "on balance these features do not
overcome the clear legislative intent to plainly dispense with a culpable mental
state."132
The Court did not describe the "features" that comprised its
"balancing" test. The Court simply concluded that its decision that a mens rea is
not required for felony murder "is consistent with the historical purpose of the
felony-murder rule,133 the very essence of which is to make a person guilty of an
'unintentional' murder when he causes another person's death during the
commission of some type of a felony."1 34
Considering these cases on collateral review, federal district courts have
found that felony murder convictions predicated on felony DWI charges do not
violate due process, even though neither offense requires proof of any mens
rea.1 35 Three federal district courts in Texas have considered this issue, and all
have rejected the claim that the convictions are unconstitutional.136 As one court
explained, "the United States Supreme Court has never articulated a general
constitutional doctrine of mens rea, and it has never held that a state's definition
of a crime must include a mens rea element."1 37
B.

The Allure of TransferredIntent

In explaining the felony murder doctrine, many courts turn to the doctrine of
transferred intent.138 The basic idea is simple: "The malice which plays a part in
the commission of the felony is transferred by the law to the homicide. As a
result of the fictional transfer, the homicide is deemed committed with malice;
and a homicide with malice is common law murder."1 39

131. Id. at 305.
132. Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Adams v. Stephens, No. 3:13-CV-854-M, 2014 WL 3728603, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 28,
2014); Strickland v. Thaler, No. 4:09-CV-746-Y, 2010 WL 4181266, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9,
2010). Lomax v. Thaler, No. H-09-0705, 2010 WL 3362203, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2010);
Mayer v. Dormire, No. 4:03CV1562 FRB, 2005 WL 2454028, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2005).
136. Adams, 2014 WL 3728603, at *3; Strickland, 2010 WL 4181266, at *4; Lomax, 2010 WL
3362203, at *5; Mayer, 2005 WL 2454028, at *4.
137. See State v. Cheatham, 6 P.3d 815, 821 (Idaho 2000); State v. O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d
102, 107 (Tenn. 1999). Although some courts recognize that transferred intent is a fiction, others
take the idea rather literally, as if there is some intent that is transferred. See, e.g., State v. Gardner,
340 S.E.2d 701, 710 (N.C. 1986).
138. State v. Gardner, 340 S.E.2d 701, 710 (N.C. 1986) (citing 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 145 (15th ed. 1979)).
139. See Rodriquez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 26, 28-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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Prior to Lomax, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, like many other
courts, had used the transferred intent theory to reject claims that felony murder
imposed strict liability for murder.140 The precedent-establishing case was
Rodriquez, in which the court explained that "the culpable mental state for the
act of murder is supplied by the mental state accompanying the underlying
committed or attempted felony giving rise to the act. The transference of the
mental element establishing criminal responsibility for the original act to the
resulting act conforms to and preserves the traditional mens rea requirement of
the criminal law."141

However, when felony DWI is the predicate for felony murder, there is no
proven intent to transfer, because felony DWI does not require proof of any
mens rea. This difficulty required the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in
Lomax to overrule Rodriquez, at least regarding the transferred intent matter.142
The Lomax court explained that although in Rodriquez the court had "decided
that the culpable mental state for 'the act of murder' is supplied by the culpable
mental state accompanying the underlying felony," this decision was wrong,
because "the very nature of the felony-murder rule is that there is no culpable
mental state 'for the act of murder."'1 43 Thus, the court decided to overrule "that
portion of the holding in Rodriquez that a culpable mental state is required for
the act of murder in a felony-murder prosecution and that the mental state of the
underlying felony supplies this culpable mental state."1 44
In Mayer, the Missouri court of appeals also became entangled in the
"transferred intent" quagmire. 145 Mayer argued that because the underlying
felony of driving while intoxicated lacks a mens rea requirement, there was no
mens rea to "transfer" to the murder.146 The court responded that while
transferred intent might have been part of the historical conception of felony
murder, felony murder is now a matter of statutory definition. 147 The court
quoted that definition-"A person commits the crime of murder in the second
degree if he: . . . Commits or attempts to commit any felony, and, in the

perpetration or attempted perpetration of such felony ... another person is killed
as a result of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of such felony"-and
then observed that this definition is "full and complete on its face, and the
transferred intent analysis is not required by its terms." 4 8

Id.
Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Id. at 306-07.
Id. at 307.
State v. Mayer, 3 S.W.3d 423, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 426 (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.021.1(2) (West 2015)).
See Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L.

CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1085-93 (1997) (discussing substantive and formal strict liability).

&

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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This is arguably the right result for the wrong reason. The Lomax and
Mayer courts rejected the transferred intent rule because felony murder does not
require intent to commit the murder but certainly felony murder requires some
intent, otherwise felony murder would be a true, substantive strict liability
offense rather than, as it has always been understood, an offense that imposes
formal strict liability with respect to causing a death during the commission of a
felony.1 49 But "transferred intent" never does any real work in supplying
intent. 1o When used properly, the concept of transferred intent is just a
shorthand method-a heuristic-for explaining that the actor did act with the
required intent. For example, if A intends to kill B but instead kills C, A's intent
to kill B can be said to transfer to C, for the purpose of proving that A had the
necessary intent-intent to kill another person-to be convicted of murder.
"Transferred intent" reaches the correct result in this case because A intended to
kill a person, and it does not matter whether A actually killed B or C, so long as
both B and C are persons.
C. Strict Liabilityfor Murder?
If culpability for felony murder is not transferred from the predicate felony,
then is felony murder a true, substantive strict liability offense? Neither felony
murder nor felony DWI is a true strict liability offense. While neither requires
proof of a particular mens rea, it is not possible to be convicted of either without
having acted with a fairly high level of mental culpability. As one scholar has
stated,

'

Even the much-criticized felony murder rule does not impose liability
without fault: At worst, it leads to a grossly excessive penalty for what
is usually an intentional and serious underlying felony. In many cases,
the defendant was reckless as to the risk of death, and so might justly
have been convicted of at least manslaughter even without the rule.' 5
The offender might be punished in excess of his culpability for the murder but he
is not punished in the absence of any culpability at all. This is not to suggest that

149. See William L. Prosser, TransferredIntent, 45 TEX. L. REV. 650, 650 (1967).
150. David P. Bryden, Reason and Guesswork in the Definition of Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 585, 587 (2000); see also Kent Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth
Amendment: Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 965 (1969) ("His only real
complaint is that his penalty is disproportionate to his blameworthiness."); Robinson, supra note
104, at 665 ("An evidentiary theory would justify a felony-murder rule under the argument that such
killings probably are purposeful, knowing, or at least reckless under circumstances manifesting an
extreme indifference to the value of human life. The creation of risk to life for the purpose of
engaging in a felony manifests an actor's indifference to the value of human life.").
151. Binder, supra note 20, at 435 (quoting People v. Suarez, 844 N.E.2d 721, 729 (N.Y.
2005)).
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disproportionate punishment is not a problem, only that it is a different problem
than strict liability.
Additionally, as another commentator has suggested, recklessness can
aggravate culpability, which is the basis for the depraved heart murder doctrine:
"a sufficiently bad reason for acting can aggravate culpability for imposing risk.
This principle can explain the prevalent rule that aggravates a reckless homicide
from manslaughter to murder, if the killing manifests an 'abandoned and
malignant heart' or 'depraved indifference to human life.""1 52 This principle can
also support the felony murder rule that imposes liability for murder when a
death occurs during the course of a felony-or at least certain felonies, including
the felony of repeated DWI offenses.1 53
A true, substantive strict liability offense is one that risks imposing
punishment in the complete absence of mental culpability.154 But someone
cannot be convicted of felony DWI on the basis of prior DWI convictions-and
thus cannot be convicted of felony murder with repeat offender DWI as the
predicate felony-and not have acted with extreme recklessness. The prior
convictions serve as a warning that the conduct of driving while intoxicated is
risky.
The person who chooses to drink and drive despite this warning can
reasonably be regarded as indifferent to the consequences of his choices. As one
commentator observed, "Prior intoxicated acts signify subjective awareness of
one's propensities to cause harm."1 56 Or as one judge observed during
sentencing of a repeat DWI offender whose second DWI offense caused the
deaths of three people:
Sentencing is not about generalities. It's about the specifics. In your
situation, I considered the fact that you had a previous alcohol-related
offense, so I want you to understand this. I considered the fact that you
in 1998 were convicted of driving while intoxicated with a point oneseven reading, and less than three to four years later, basically went and

152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 267 (1987) ("Strict
liability imposes guilt without regard to whether the defendant knew or could reasonably have
known some relevant feature of the situation.").

154. People v. Hendrix, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 761 (Ct. App. 2013) ("Knowledge of the
dangers of driving while under the influence can be obtained through the general experience of
having suffered a driving under the influence conviction"); People v. McCarnes, 224 Cal. Rptr. 846,
849-850 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Defendant also contends that his previous convictions for driving under
the influence were not probative on the knowledge element of implied malice, because the
convictions showed only that he knew such driving was unlawful, but not that he knew it was
dangerous.
However, the reason that driving under the influence is unlawful is because it is
dangerous, and to ignore that basic proposition, particularly in the context of an offense for which
the punishment for repeat offenders is more severe, is to make a mockery of the legal system as well
as the deaths of thousands each year who are innocent victims of drunken drivers.").
155. Derrick Augustus Carter, Bifurcations of Consciousness: The Elimination of the Self-

inducedIntoxication Excuse, 64 Mo. L. REV. 383, 424 (1999).
156. Ronald A. Silkworth, State of Maryland v. Michael Reck Unofficial Transcript of the

Sentencing Statement, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 305, 309-10 (2003).
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did the very, very same thing. Except this time, you were unfortunate.
More importantly, the three victims in this case and their families were
unfortunate. So I do consider that an aggravating circumstance.15 7
The defendant who is a repeat DWI offender had actual rather than
hypothetical or fictional awareness that his decision to drink and drive was
criminal. His failure to abide by the law even after he had been punished for a
prior transgression justifies the belief that he was acting with not just awareness
of but indifference to the risks that his behavior created. 5 8
D.

Punishment in Excess of Culpability?

The most compelling criticism of felony murder is that it allows for the
possibility of punishment in excess of culpability.1 59 Because felony murder
does not require proof of culpability for a death that occurs during the
commission of a felony, even accidental killings can potentially be punished as
murder.160 This, of course, is contrary to the basic principle that intentional
wrongdoing is more culpablel61 and therefore ought to be punished more
severely than non-intentional wrongdoing. 162

157. See Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953,
962-63 (1998); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 118-20
(1996);Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 486-89 (1992); see also
Jeffries v. State, 90 P.3d 185, 193 (ALASKA CT. App. 2004), aff'd, 169 P.3d 913 (Alaska 2007)
(concluding that murder "can be established not only through evidence that the defendant engaged
in egregiously dangerous driving, but also through evidence of the defendant's extreme intoxication,
the defendant's decision to ignore warnings not to drive, the defendant's past convictions for
driving while intoxicated, the defendant's refusal to participate in court-ordered treatment for
alcohol abuse imposed as part of the defendant's sentence or conditions of probation from previous
DWI convictions, and the defendant's decision to drive despite a license suspension or revocation
stemming from previous DWI convictions.").
158. See, e.g. Jeanne H. Seibold, Note, The Felony-Murder Rule: In Search of a Viable
Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAW. 133, 160 (1978) ("The concept of basing the degree of punishment on the
seriousness of the result of the criminal act seems grossly misplaced in a legal system which
recognizes the degree of mental culpability as the appropriate standard for fixing criminal
liability.").
159. Id. at 153.
160. Id. at 142.
161. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 155 (1987) ("Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is
the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and,
therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished."); see also id. at 171 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Enmund v. Florida, 485 U.S. 782, 798 (1981)) ("It is fundamental that 'causing harm
intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally."').
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1951) ("The contention that an injury can
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.").
162. But see Paul H. Robinson, supra note 104, at 669-71.
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Felony murder does not, however, necessarily result in excessive
punishment. Although some defendants who are convicted of felony murder are
no doubt punished in excess of their culpability, it is also likely true that many
defendants do deserve this punishment. The question raised by the use of felony
DWI as a predicate for felony murder is whether these particular felony murder
convictions necessarily or even likely impose punishment in excess of the
punishment that a defendant deserves.
1.

How Culpable is Becoming Intoxicated?

Becoming intoxicated is generally understood to be reckless.163 In no
jurisdiction is voluntary intoxication a general defense to a crime.164 Although
in some jurisdictions intoxication might be a defense to a crime that requires a
mens rea of intent or knowledge,165 in most jurisdictions intoxication cannot
negate recklessness.166 As the Model Penal Code explains, "[w]hen recklessness
establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced
intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he
been sober, such unawareness is immaterial."1 67
Not only is intoxication generally not a defense, but intoxication is
commonly viewed as aggravating reckless behavior.168 As the Fourth Circuit

163. See Montanav. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 49-50 (1996).
164. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.630 (1996) (providing intoxication "is relevant to
negate an element of the offense that requires that the defendant intentionally cause a result"); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 29.4(b) (West 2015) ("intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or
not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent"); COLO. REV. Stat. § 18-1-804(3)
(1998) ("A person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if, by reason of intoxication that is
not self-induced at the time he acts, he lacks capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law"). Some states do not allow evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate any mens rea. See,
e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-503 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-207 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN
tit. 11, § 421 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-230 (1993); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 562.076 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1997).
165. See, e.g., CAL PENAL CODE

§

29.4(b) (West 2015) ("Evidence of voluntary intoxication

is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific
intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored
express malice aforethought.").
166. MODEL PENAL CODE

§

2.08(2) (AMER. LAW INST., Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); see also

United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 948 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Defendant's state of voluntary
intoxication thus would not have been relevant to whether the jury could have inferred from the
circumstances of the crime that he was aware of the risk created by his conduct."); State
v. Cameron, 514 A.2d 1302, 1307 (N.J. 1986); State v. Trott, 130 S.E. 627 (N.C. 1925).
167. See People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 709 (N.Y. 1983) ("The common-law courts
viewed the decision to drink to excess, with its attendant risks to self and others, as an independent
culpable act . . . [i]n utilitarian terms, the risk of excessive drinking should be added to and not
subtracted from the risks created by the conduct of the drunken defendant for there is no social or
penological purpose to be served by a rule that permits one who voluntarily drinks to be exonerated
from failing to foresee the results of his conduct if he is successful at getting drunk.").
168. Fleming, 739 F.2d at 949.

28

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 67: 1

Court of Appeals wrote in affirming a decision that drunken driving could imply
malice,
In the present case ... danger did not arise only by defendant's
determining to drive while drunk.
Rather, in addition to being
intoxicated while driving, defendant drove in a manner that could be
taken to indicate depraved disregard of human life, particularlyin light
of the fact that because he was drunk his reckless behavior was all the
more dangerous.169

2.

How Culpable is Driving While Intoxicated?

'

Although the felony murder doctrine has been criticized for imposing
potentially excessive punishment, it is possible that in certain cases, or certain
categories of cases, defendants are sufficiently culpable to warrant a murder
conviction. As a formal matter, felony murder does not require proof of mental
culpability. As a practical matter, however, there are many cases in which
mental culpability is evident: "Requiring proof of culpability for the separate act
of killing may not change the result in many cases. If a defendant undertakes a
dangerous felony, he probably has exhibited the extreme recklessness or malice
aforethought necessary for a conviction of murder."'1 70 Thus, in many cases
felony murder "represents a formal approximation of extremely reckless
homicide."' 7
Courts have typically been unsympathetic to defendants' claims that driving
while intoxicated is not highly culpable.172 The Supreme Court of Tennessee
once proclaimed that "driving an automobile while under the influence of an
intoxicant or in such a manner as to endanger the lives of others is conduct

169. Roth, supra note 4, at 491; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 36-37 (AM.
LAW INST., Official Draft 1980). The Model Penal Code rejected a traditional felony murder offense
but did include a depraved heart murder provision, which additionally provided for a presumption
of "extreme indifference to the value of human life" when the actor was engaged in certain criminal
conduct. Id. at 38. "[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when . . (b) it is committed recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness
and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or
an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate
sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2. (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 1980).
170. Roth, supra note 4, at 459 n.73 (quoting Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 SW.

U.L. Rev. 413, 420 (1981)).
171. But see Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539, 544 (Ky. 1977) (Palmore, C. J.,
dissenting) ("I concede that fatal carelessness in the operation of a motor vehicle calls for stern
punishment, but murder is something else. There simply is a difference in culpability between
committing an act that endangers people whose presence is known and an act that endangers people
whose presence should be anticipated but in fact is not known.").

172. Hardin v. State, 356 S.W.2d 595, 595-96 (Tenn. 1962) (citing Edwards v. State, 304
S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. 1957)).
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malum in se which supplies the necessary criminal intent and eliminates the
necessity of showing that death was the natural and probable result of the
criminal act."1 73 The public, too, seems unsympathetic. As one commentator has
suggested,
One who chooses to become voluntarily intoxicated to such an extent
forfeits his right to close scrutiny of culpability and is punished for the
harmful acts that result from the "guilty" decision to become
intoxicated. In essence, these intoxication doctrines reflect the view that
a "guilty" drunken individual who causes harm without the normally
required mental state, but while in a self-induced, impaired condition, is
quite unlike a truly "innocent" sober individual who causes harm
without the requisite mental state.1 74
To find an intoxicated driver reckless, most courts look not to the moment
when he ran the stop sign at 65 mph or crossed over the center line into
oncoming traffic, but instead look to the moment when he undertook to drive
while intoxicated. 7 5 This time-framing manipulation has been criticized.1 76 But
adopting a wide time frame might not pose the same problems in felony murder
cases as it does in other cases. As one scholar has observed, "the decision to
frame time narrowly makes sense as a general rule of criminal law; wide-ranging
inquiries into an actor's pre-harm experiences and thought processes as a method
for determining that an accident was criminal would invite both over-deterrence
and under-security." 17 Felony murder, though, is different, because "the
decision to frame time narrowly is less sensible in the felony-murder setting,
where neither over-deterrence nor under-security should concern us."

78

173. Tomkovicz, supra note 7 at 1477 n.189.

174. People v. Whitfield, 868 P.2d 272, 281 (Cal. 1994) ("The circumstance that a defendant,
when a fatal traffic collision occurs, is unconscious as a result of voluntary intoxication, does not
preclude a finding that the defendant harbored malice, because malice may have been formed prior
to that time.").
175. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive CriminalLaw, 33 STAN.

L. REV. 591, 593-94, 600-16, 664-65 (1981).
176. Cole, supra note 103 at 109.
177. Id.
178. Additionally, it has been argued that mental culpability is not the sole determinate of
appropriate punishment:
The criminal law has never been limited to mens rea alone in assessing the severity of
crime. Actus reus and results count, too. Murder is not the same offense as attempted
murder, even though the two crimes have similar mentes reae. Murder is a more serious
crime, even if the main difference is the result. The felony murder rule, like classical
criminal law in general, is founded on the proposition that the result is sometimes a factor
that aggravates or reduces the severity of a crime. Specifically, the felony murder rule
reflects a judgment that a robbery that causes a human death is not merely a robbery but
something more serious; it is more akin to a murder than to a robbery.
David Crump, Reconsidering the Felony Murder Rule in Light ofModern Criticisms: Doesn't
the Conclusion Depend Upon the ParticularRule at Issue?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1155,

1162 (2009).
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For purposes of assessing culpability, one important factor is whether a
defendant has previously been convicted of a DWI offense. A prior conviction
for DWI means that the defendant has actual, objective information that his
behavior is illegal and considered to be dangerous. He himself might assess
things differently and decide that his behavior is not dangerous, but he is on
notice that he is taking a risk. He is certainly not an innocent or even negligent
actor; he is necessarily consciously disregarding a risk that his behavior is
dangerous. 179
Absent prior DWI convictions, the question whether a defendant was
consciously aware of the risk is harder to answer. Thus, whether felony murder
prosecutions on the basis of felony DWI are likely to impose disproportionate
punishment depends upon why the DWI is a felony. When the DWI is a felony
because of prior DWI convictions, it is less likely that punishment will be
excessive. However, prior DWI convictions are just one way that a DWI charge
can be a felony offense. When a DWI is a felony for reasons unrelated to
culpability, then the risk of excessive punishment is increased. For example,
under Texas law a DWI is a felony if the drunken driver is driving with a
passenger under the age of fifteen. But the drunken driver who drives with a
fourteen-year-old passenger is not more culpable for causing death than is the
drunken driver who drives with a sixteen-year-old passenger.
This problem of circumstances unrelated to culpability for causing death
meaning the difference between murder and manslaughter is one of several
reasons why legislatures should revise intoxication manslaughter statutes to
make repeat offender DWI an aggravating factor that subjects drunken drivers
who kill to murder liability directly rather than by application of the felony
murder statute.
VI. WHY LEGISLATURES SHOULD ACT

In certain cases of drunken drivers who kill, conviction for felony murder
results in an appropriate-or at least not necessarily disproportionatepunishment. When a defendant has previously been convicted of a DWI offense,
then there is compelling evidence that he was consciously aware that his
behavior created an unacceptable risk of harm. In disregarding that risk, he can
be regarded as culpably equivalent to someone who takes a gun to a robbery.
When the intoxicated driver crashes his car and kills someone, or the robber
shoots his gun and kills someone, no one is surprised. If felony murder is
appropriate in any cases, such cases would seem to include repeat DWI offenders
whose intoxicated driving causes death.1so

179. See Missouri v. Mayer, 3 S.W.3d 423, 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Pembleton, 978
S.W.2d 352, 356 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
180. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.045 (West 2003). Under this statute:
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Even though felony murder is arguably appropriate in some cases in which a
drunken driver kills, it is not appropriate in all cases-otherwise every
intoxication manslaughter case would be felony murder. The problem is that an
assortment of aggravating factors can enhance a DWI charge to a felony, and not
all of those factors necessarily make a defendant appropriately liable for murder.
Although the repeat offender is necessarily culpable, because his prior
convictions provide actual notice that his behavior is dangerous, other
aggravating factors-those that are either beyond the control of the defendant or
that do not increase the culpability of his conduct-impose felony-murder
liability on the basis of contingent circumstances rather than on the basis of
enhanced culpability.
A.

Culpability is Not Always Inherent

Whether a particular defendant who has caused a death in the course of
driving while intoxicated can be said to have necessarily acted with enhanced or
extreme recklessness depends upon why the DWI offense is a felony. In
Pembleton, Mayer, and Lomax, the DWI offenses were felonies because the
defendants were repeat DWI offenders.
In these cases, the defendants
necessarily had notice that their behavior was unacceptably dangerous.
However, prior DWI offenses is not the only grounds for a DWI to be a felony.
For example, under Texas law, driving while intoxicated a felony if the
intoxicated driver is driving with a passenger under the age of fifteen.
This
statutory provision was used to convict Edwin Glen Bigon of felony murder.182
But nothing about the fact that Bigon had decided to drive while intoxicated with
a passenger who happened to be a child made his decision necessarily more
culpable regarding the risk of causing death than if he had decided to drive while
intoxicated without a passenger, or with a passenger who was an adult. Bigon's
culpability for causing death was not enhanced because of the age of his
passenger, and thus the age of his passenger should not be the basis for imposing
felony murder liability.

(a) A person commits an offense if:
(1) the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place; and
(2) the vehicle being operated by the person is occupied by a passenger who is
younger than 15 years of age.
(b) An offense under this section is a state jail felony.
181. Bigon v. State, No. 03-05-00692-CR, 2006 WL 2852476, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 4,
2006).
182. In Texas, for example, the factors that make a DWI offense a felony are found in one
provision of the penal code (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09 (West 2015)) while the offense of
DWI is defined in another (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (West 2015)).
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B. FairNotice
Prosecutions of drunken drivers who kill for felony murder are based on the
interplay of at least two statutes: the felony murder statute and the driving while
intoxicated statute. Additionally, determining whether a DWI offense is a felony
likely requires consideration of more than one statutory provision.183
Appreciating that a drunken driver who kills can be guilty of murder requires
understanding the complex connections among these already complex statutes.
Meanwhile, intoxication manslaughter or vehicular manslaughter statutes are
straightforward: a single statute declares that a drunken driver who kills is guilty
of manslaughter. Given the complexity of the statutory scheme that allows
prosecution of drunken drivers who kill for felony murder, and the simplicity of
the manslaughter statute, the average citizen could reasonably think that
manslaughter is the only homicide offense that applies to these cases.
The California legislature recently revised its DWI statute to require that
people who are convicted of DWI offenses be warned that DWI offenses can be
punished as murder:
(a) The court shall advise a person convicted of a violation of Section
23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, or a violation of Section 23152
or 23153, as follows: "You are hereby advised that being under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, impairs your ability to safely
operate a motor vehicle. Therefore, it is extremely dangerous to human
life to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both. If
you continue to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or
both, and, as a result of that driving, someone is killed, you can be
charged with murder."1

84

Of course, the average citizen is expected to know the law. 85 On the other
hand, felony murder prosecutions of drunken drivers who kill are, as one court
suggested, a "novel or imaginative use" of the law.186 If this novelty amounts to
"an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute," then it could be a

183. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23593 (West 1999).
184. See State v. Woods, 179 A. 1, 2 (Vt. 1935) ("The maxim, 'Ignorantia legis non excusat,'
and the corresponding presumption that everyone is conclusively presumed to know the law, are of
unquestioned application in Vermont as elsewhere, both in civil and in criminal cases.").

185. State v. Jones, 516 S.E.2d 405, 413 (N.C. App. 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 538
S.E.2d 917 (N.C. 2000).
186. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192 (1977) (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964)); see also United States v. Burnom, 27 F.3d 283, 284 (7th Cir. 1994)
("The due process clause . . supplies criminal defendants protection against novel developments in
judicial doctrine."). The dissenting opinion in Jones argued that the novel use of the felony murder
statute did violate due process. See Jones, 516 S.E.2d at 423 (arguing that "defendant was not
provided fair notice that his conduct would subject him to the felony-murder rule").
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violation of due process.
As the Supreme Court has explained, "the notion
that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to
criminal penalties is fundamental to our concept of constitutional liberty." 88
Even if the novelty of felony DWI as a predicate for felony murder is not so
novel as to be a due process violation, prosecutors and courts-and especially
legislatures, who write the statutes-should be concerned that statutory schemes
that allow for novel or imaginative prosecutions can undermine respect for the
law. Legislatures can remedy this complexity and lack of clarity by revising
DWI statutes to impose murder liability for repeat DWI offenders whose
drunken driving causes death.
VII. CONCLUSION

Driving while intoxicated and felony murder are both offenses that do not
require proof of a particular mens rea. Nevertheless, for those drunken drivers
who kill-and who can be prosecuted for felony murder on the basis of prior
DWI convictions that make their present DWI offense a felony-a felony murder
conviction does not necessarily result in punishment that is disproportionate to
culpability. The novelty of such prosecutions, however, combined with the wellknown offense of intoxication or vehicular manslaughter, means that the average
person could reasonably believe that deaths caused by drunken driving are
punishable as manslaughter and not murder. To make clear that drunken drivers
who kill are subject to punishment for murder, legislatures should amend driving
while intoxicated statutes to impose this liability directly.

187. Marks, 430 U.S. at 191 (1977); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266
(1997) (explaining that "due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal
statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be
within its scope").

188. See Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Skilling: More Blind Monks Examining the Elephant, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 358 (2011) (observing that "a code that does not give fair notice will
undermine faith in the criminal justice system as a whole, and undercut the moral stigma upon
which the credibility of the system must rest").

